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Abstract 
This article examines a series of well-documented changes in post-war English higher education: 
the massification of, and increased differentiation within, the system, as well as changing 
relationships between credentials, skills and incomes. It offers an account of the new liberal arts 
degrees rapidly emerging at both elite and non-elite universities in England, explaining these as a 
response to, and negotiation of, an ever-changing higher-education landscape. Through an 
analysis of the promotional websites of the 17 English liberal arts degrees offered in the 2016-17 
academic year, the article links their emergence to broader trends, while insisting that there are 
crucial differences in the ways in which elite and non-elite universities use new degrees to 
negotiate the higher education landscape. 
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We are not an employment agency; all we can do is to give you a grounding in the art of 
mixing with your fellow men, to tell you what to expect from life and give you an 
outward manner and inward poise, an old prescription from the eighteenth century which 
we call a classical education, an education which confers the infrequent virtues of good 
sense and good taste (Connolly, 2008 [1938]: 258) 
 
Introduction 
When it comes to higher education in England, it seems, the only constant is change. Universities 
are consistently impelled to adapt to the shifting sands of government policy, industrial needs 
and public mood. But how do different sorts of higher education institutions (HEIs), negotiating 
very different conditions in terms of prestige and mission, manage this change? 
This article examines a series of higher education shifts in England, ongoing but which 
can broadly be traced back to the post-war period: the direction of travel from an elite to a mass 
system; toward increasing differentiation and a conception of institutions as competitors; the rise 
of the credential society and credential inflation; and a changing discourse around employability. 
Throughout these shifts it is arguably the humanities disciplines which have most struggled to 
assert themselves as central to higher education’s mission. Such changes have been well-
documented as well as critiqued. This paper, however, uses an increasingly popular negotiation 
of higher educational change – the English liberal arts degree – as a lens through which to 
examine a set of tensions at the heart of broader shifts, especially as they relate to the humanities. 
If HEIs are increasingly turning to North American models of education, what does this tell us 
about what is happening to English higher education more broadly? And given that different 
HEIs must manage very different conditions, how do such differences manifest themselves in the 
ways competing institutions conceptualise the liberal arts? 
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As of the 2016-17 academic year, there will be 17 (HEIs) in England marketing degrees 
branded as ‘liberal arts’.1 Irrespective of attempts to associate liberal arts degrees with an 
Ancient Greek liberal education suitable for free men (constituting the ‘trivium’ of linguistic arts 
and the ‘quadrivium’ of scientific arts), discussed below, the concept of liberal arts is much more 
closely associated with a North American tradition which has flourished, in particular, in small 
private colleges. Here the liberal arts are broadly characterized by the principle that general 
education should precede technical specialism, considered appropriate to the higher levels of 
undergraduate education, or even consigned to graduate school. This focus on general education 
leads to a number of specific features of a North American liberal arts degree. They are non-
vocational, attempting to impart generic skills rather than those specific to a particular sphere of 
work. Although there is a tendency to associate the liberal arts with the humanities (which 
Harpham [2011] has identified as a curiously American disciplinary formation), they tend to be 
more broadly interdisciplinary than this, with students required to take science components 
throughout their degrees. In conjunction with a notable disciplinary eclecticism, liberal arts 
degrees often contain some notion of a core curriculum of general education shared by all. 
Pedagogically there is a focus on small-group teaching, while philosophically the liberal arts 
approach often stresses the idea of preparing citizens for civic life by pursuing a holistic teaching 
method which does not separate intellectual from moral and political development. This concept 
of a democratic function for the liberal arts sits in tension with a connected but more elitist idea 
of liberal arts as providing those with the leisure to pursue a general education with a number of 
the ‘infrequent virtues’, as in Cyril Connolly’s invocation above, suitable for leadership roles. 
 In its recent translation, not only to England but to many parts of northern and central 
Europe, the liberal arts degree is both continuing a number of these traditions, and departing 
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from them. In the analysis which follows I try to explicate what is happening when the idea of 
the liberal arts is translated to the English higher education context. Through discourse analysis 
of all webpages associated with all 17 English liberal arts degrees, I explore a series of tensions 
which animate the attempts of HEIs to promote their liberal arts degrees. Initially I look at the 
tension between liberal arts degrees as traditional (especially the link to Ancient Greece) as 
against their promotion (and a conception of their students) as innovative. Next the concept of 
employability, and its sometimes paradoxical relation to the idea of education for its own sake, is 
explored. Even while the importance of intellectual curiosity as an intrinsic good is stressed, the 
discussion of this intrinsic good is almost invariably connected to the job market. Here 
intellectual qualities are re-described as marketable commodities. The article then goes on to 
discuss this idea of the unique, intellectually curious polymath as ideal liberal arts student, and 
how this sits in tension with both generic descriptions of this student and the generic (or soft) 
skills liberal arts degrees provide. Finally, I turn to the question of elitism, the elite student and 
the elite university, and examine how this works both with and against an idea of the liberal arts 
as a reinvigoration of democracy. 
 Throughout the discussion, the article aims to explore two wider questions. Firstly, I am 
interested in how different types of HEI promote liberal arts degrees. Although at times the 
claims made will be broadly true across the sector, at others differences will be indicated 
between the eight old, six post-war and three new HEIs now advertising such degrees. This is 
especially true where questions of the relation between elitism and the reinvigoration of 
democracy are discussed. Secondly, this question of the problem of elitism associated with the 
liberal arts degree is related to a broader debate about the elitist functions of England’s mass 
higher education system. Here the argument is that, in a higher education system now considered 
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to be in perpetual crisis (Hillman, 2016), elite HEIs increasingly innovate, but precisely to 
conserve an historical advantage. Since much of that advantage comes through the rather 
nebulous (and difficult to quantify) concept of prestige (Brewer, Gates and Goldman, 2002), this 
notion is consistently invoked even while innovation is also stressed. I argue that this is one way 
for elite HEIs to maintain an advantage within a mass higher education system. 
 
Methods 
The following discussion is based upon discourse analysis of the webpages of the 17 HEIs 
promoting liberal arts degrees in the 2016-17 academic year. HEIs were identified using the 
course finder of the Universities and Colleges Admission Service (UCAS) website, and 
institutions were categorised into ‘old’, ‘post-war’ and ‘new’. All publicly-available webpages 
pertaining to the liberal arts degree were included (amongst other things: course descriptions, 
module and assessment summaries, descriptions of entry requirements, possible occupational 
outcomes, and testimonials and diaries from current and former students). 
 The approximately 90,000 words thus collected were manually coded for emerging 
themes and a grid created to cross-reference themes as they related to different institutions. The 
themes discussed in this article specifically concern competing conceptions of a humanities 
education which existed in tension throughout the webpages (namely tradition-innovation, 
employability-intellectual curiosity, unique individuals-generic skills, and democracy-elite). 
Other themes emerged and will be discussed in further publications.    
 Before turning to the analysis proper, the article first explicates some of this broader 
context: the massification of higher education, increasing differentiation between HEIs, and the 
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rise of credentialism. In all three respects, the English higher education context can be said to be 
getting closer to its US counterpart, and this may be one reason for an increasing similarity 
between the types of degrees offered by US and English HEIs. 
 
Massification, differentiation and credentialism 
Although the shift from an elite to a mass higher education system is by no means linear or 
straightforward to read (Scott, 1995), what we do know is that between 1985 and 2010 the 
number of people participating in British higher education increased from one million to 2.5 
million (Temple, 2015). The early ideology of massification rested on concepts of social 
mobility and meritocracy more broadly at work in post-war social reforms, and which were 
explicitly invoked in the Robbins Report of 1963 advocating expansion of the sector (Scott, 
2014). That other seismic shake-up, John Major’s relaxing of the conditions placed on the title of 
university in 1992, likewise referred to the principle of social mobility. The changes have even 
been attributed to Major’s personal dislike for the elitism tied up in the previously binary 
(university and polytechnic) system (Brown and Carasso, 2013). 
 Although both the post-war and the 1992 reformers envisaged their innovations as 
breaking down divisions between institutions and creating a more homogenous (and so less 
elitist) system, conversely increased differentiation was the result. Just as the post-war 
universities began to distinguish themselves, in their governmental structures, burgeoning radical 
political scenes and even in their brutalist architecture, from the perceived stuffiness and 
pomposity of the old universities, so those old universities increasingly presented themselves as, 
by dint of that very stuffiness and pomposity, fundamentally more prestigious and indeed serious 
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than the upstart institutions. And no sooner had the Further and Higher Education Act come into 
effect in 1992, than the elite universities began to distinguish themselves as the Russell Group. 
Thus the very processes of massification, encouraged by successive governments with a view to 
the principles of social mobility, homogenisation and anti-elitism, seem invariably to lead to a 
retrenchment of elitist divisions and sensibilities. 
 In 1979, Randall Collins offered an explanation for similar processes he noted in the 
American post-war ‘credential society’. Arguing against the ‘technocratic’ idea that increasing 
numbers of American citizens were attaining ever higher levels of qualification because 
technological advances required ever higher degrees of competence, Collins instead claimed that 
credentials function as currency on a market. Whilst having no intrinsic meaning (they do not, 
for the most part, signify any great level of technical competence), credentials signify 
membership of a closed group. They demonstrate a general level of social and cultural 
competence but, more than this, are marks of distinction which signify class membership: people 
with particular sorts of credentials are ‘our kind of people’. Collins clearly draws on Bourdieu’s 
(Bourdieu and Passeron, 1979 [1964], 1990 [1970]) critical sociology of education here, but 
criticises Bourdieu for failing to explain the specific process by which credential inflation takes 
place. Collins is specifically concerned with the mechanism by which cultural currency such as 
an educational qualification comes to take on such social significance. Culture becomes ‘money’ 
to be exchanged only at that point when cultural organisations quantify and measure how much 
culture people have. The value of a credential (that is culture, quantified) in the credential society 
is therefore determined by market conditions (supply, demand, competition and inflation) rather 
than intrinsic worth.   
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For Collins, what has been key in post-war American society is the growth of political (as 
opposed to productive) labour; that is, the increase of white-collar jobs or, as he puts it, the 
installation of leisure at the heart of work. Such work is not technically complex, nor does it add 
to the sum total of capital produced. Instead it organises the distribution of ever-increasing (and 
increasingly complex) capital. Indeed, were the need for technical competence to be the primary 
driver in the credential society, one would expect technical and highly specialised professions to 
be those which are the best paid. Instead, ‘the most important routes to power and income are 
through the realms of organizational politics and administration’ (Collins, 1979: 49-50).  In order 
to make decisions about who is best placed to fill such important distributive functions, the 
credential society requires to know not levels of technical competence, but rather who has 
required those ‘soft skills’ of organisation, administration and leadership most prized in white-
collar work. Such soft skills are not only those associated with a university education. They are 
also inextricably tied up with social class.  
 Gerbrand Tholen (2016) has recently applied and extended Collins’s theory to the current 
UK job market. In a mass higher education context where there is no longer a clear link between 
skills, jobs and incomes, social position is increasingly assured by ‘symbolic closure’. By 
maintaining a privileged control over the social meanings of credentials and skills, the elite are 
able to reproduce symbolic dominance. In the supposed ‘knowledge economy’, groups no longer 
close themselves off merely by restricting access to resources and opportunities (Weber’s [1978 
(1922)] ‘social closure’), but crucially monopolise the right to determine the symbolic meaning 
of credentials. Thus, irrespective of processes of social mobility (the massification of higher 
education, ever greater numbers of people with ever higher levels of education, and centralised 
attempts to homogenise higher education provision), an elite will maintain its position by 
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distinguishing, for instance, between 2.2s and 2.1s (and increasingly 2.1s and firsts), 
undergraduate and postgraduate degrees and, crucially, differences in prestige between different 
institutions. In this way elitism remains central to the functioning of a mass system.2 
Since the 1990s in England, the ideology of massification has shifted from one of 
meritocracy to the free market. Successive policy drives since the 1990s, but especially those 
from the Conservative-led governments in place since 2010, have stressed higher education as a 
private rather than a public good, the role of students as rationally calculating consumers, and a 
conception of HEIs as competing businesses. In the recent government white paper ‘Success as a 
knowledge economy’ (BIS, 2016) setting out reforms to higher education, two of the three 
general chapter headings were ‘Competition’ and ‘Choice’. In such a context, notions of a level 
playing field and of homogenising the structure of higher education provision give way to ideas 
of choice, competing capitals, and ‘gaming the system’ (Jones, 2016). 
The move from meritocratic to free-market credentialism clearly moves the English 
higher education system closer to its US counterpart. Recent suggestions that European higher 
education might be reinvigorated by a turn to the liberal arts have made positive allusions to this 
‘Americanisation’ of the system. Marijk van der Wende (2011) notes that, as European 
governments turn away from attempts to engineer higher education as a motor for social mobility 
and instead perceive it as a market in which consumers make rational choices, liberal arts will 
grow as just such a rational choice. In particular, it is a rational choice for elite institutions to 
focus on non-vocational degrees acculturating elite students into the soft skills required in elite 
professions.  
While there are clear similarities among different northern European systems of higher 
education, it is worth noting important distinctions between the relation of soft skills training to 
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elite occupations in different national contexts. As Marte Mangset (2015) has shown through her 
comparative study of the French, British and Norwegian civil service, the general humanities 
education of the typical British bureaucrat has little in common with the highly specialised social 
sciences training of their Norwegian counterpart. Having said this, Mangset found that 
Norwegian as much as French and British civil servants did stress their soft skills, irrespective of 
the generalist or specialist nature of their education.  
In the remainder of the article, the specific ways in which liberal arts degrees are being 
promoted at old, post-war and new HEIs will be discussed. By exploring a series of tensions 
which animate the promotional attempts of these diverse institutions, the article examines the 
links between specific institutional configurations and the broader political context in which they 
occur. 
 
Tradition and innovation 
In developing new liberal arts degrees, HEIs on the one hand stress that their degrees (and by 
extension the students considering them) are somehow innovate, pioneering or brave; yet on the 
other, make clear a link to an Ancient Greek tradition, sometimes alluded to with a degree of 
hyperbole: 
‘In Ancient Greece, liberal arts were essential for a citizen in order to take an active part 
in civic life’ (post-war). 
‘At _______ we retrieve the classical philosophical mission to search for first principles 
and truth’ (new). 
 
 The insistence on the liberal arts degree as ancient, and as thereby linked to highbrow 
concepts like citizenship and democracy, is a borrowing from the US context. Indeed, in the long 
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tradition of jeremiads defending liberal arts from its technicist and instrumentalist detractors, the 
importance of liberal arts’ Athenian ancestry, in particular the Socratic method, is consistently 
invoked (see, for instance, Bloom, 1987; Nussbaum, 2012; Roche, 2010). Malcolmson, Myers 
and O’Connell (1996) could go so far as to claim that the Ancient Greek tradition provided ‘the 
most fully human form of education’ (18). 
 The notion of Athenian citizenship as central to the liberal arts tradition is in complex 
relation to the problem of elitism. Margaret Ferguson (2003) notes that in Martha Nussbaum’s 
(1999) invocation of the history of philosophy as being fundamentally opposed to that of 
sophistry, she neglects the historical opposition between philosophy as ‘civilised’ (that is, 
Athenian) and sophistry as ‘barbarian’ (that is, foreign). The idea of the enlightened, liberally 
educated Athenian citizen rests heavily on the exclusion of non-citizens: foreigners, women and 
slaves. And even without these historical problems, the concept of ‘preparation for citizenship’ 
as the purpose of a liberal arts education has been critiqued as a hyperbolic claim both for what 
higher education is able to achieve, and indeed for what it should aim toward (Fish, 2008). As 
Colm Kelly (2012) puts it, ‘Forming citizens for freedom is a heavy load for educationalists to 
believe they bear’ (58). 
 Although the link to an Ancient Greek tradition is invoked by English HEIs marketing 
new liberal arts degrees, there is nonetheless a tendency to stress the newness and innovation of 
the degrees. Almost all liberal arts sites use the words ‘new’, ‘pioneering’, ‘innovative’ or 
‘exciting’ to describe their degrees. The new liberal arts degree is presented as a way of 
bypassing some of the more old-fashioned or even dull aspects of a traditional degree: one post-
war HEI’s promotional video stresses that ‘you won’t be stuck in the lecture theatre’ over a 
visual of bored-looking students in a traditional lecture hall. 
12 
 
 New HEIs tend to focus on the institution itself as demonstrating innovation and a 
pioneering spirit: 
‘It is a very challenging time for any University in the UK to support a retrieval of liberal 
arts education’ (new). 
 
This is in marked contrast to old and post-wars’ focus on the pioneering qualities considered a 
prerequisite to be a liberal arts student. We can explain such a difference with reference to the 
distinction between recruiting and selecting institutions (Zimdars 2016). While recruiting 
institutions must compete for students with other, similarly positioned HEIs in order to fill 
places, selecting institutions conversely attract many more applications than the number of 
student places available. Selective institutions are therefore able to stress the elite nature of the 
liberal arts student themselves –  their unusual levels of intellectual curiosity and their pioneering 
spirit – as opposed to the attempt to present the HEI as the innovator in the promotional materials 
of the new institutions: 
‘You should be able to acquire, analyse and communicate knowledge, be motivated and 
intellectually curious, and not afraid to try new things’ (old). 
 
 The pioneering liberal arts student at the elite institution is therefore one prepared to take 
calculated and rational risks. This concept of the rationally calculating consumer choosing a 
route to the future on the free market is one consistently invoked in government rhetoric. Here, 
although there is always risk involved, the implication is that higher education is broadly a safe 
bet, since average earnings increase with the attainment of a first degree, the requirement to pay 
back the student loan only emerges once earnings have risen beyond a particular threshold, and 
so on. The appeal to the average personal benefit in such government rhetoric, however, masks 
the very real inequalities between different students in terms of both how likely they are to attain 
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a particular salary and their relation to risk. For many young people higher education is 
inextricably tied up with risk and, far from being rationally calculating consumers, these 
students’ futures remain largely unknowable (Brynin, 2012; Williams, 2013).   
 In their invocation of the innovative and pioneering student, a number of HEIs in fact 
quite explicitly take risk into account: 
‘I know that this can be a stressful time, especially as you weigh various course offers 
and try to imagine the routes your life can take. We want to encourage you to take risks, 
to dream big, and to make your decision out of hope and determination, not fear’ (post-
war). 
 
Here the risk discourse which frames much debate about higher education is reimagined as the 
pioneering spirit necessary to succeed. As Stephen Ball (2003) has shown in his work on the 
educational choices of middle-class parents, risk is simultaneously central to the ideology of 
entrepreneurialism and choice which serves the middle class so well, and to a specific set of 
middle-class anxieties about an unknowable future. This dual aspect of risk society – its 
production of anxieties as well as the presentation of risk-taking as somehow the solution to such 
anxieties – is very clearly invoked by a number of more elite HEIs when promoting liberal arts: 
‘In our rapidly changing world, a Liberal Arts education prepares you to adapt to jobs 
that are just coming into being or to invent new ones’ (post-war). 
‘It will provide the adaptability and flexibility you need in our rapidly changing world’ 
(old). 
‘The world of work is changing very fast and there are many views on what this world 
will be like in a few years’ time. One thing seems to be clear though: we are preparing 
people today for jobs that we do not yet know exist’ (old). 
 
The risk associated with a changing labour market is, in keeping with broader trends, 
individualised here: it may be the whole world which is ‘rapidly changing’, but the onus is on 
individuals, and not governments or society, to manage such risk. Crucially, the value of the risk-
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taking liberal arts student in the unknowable future is intimately tied up with questions of 
employability and the job market. 
 
The paradox of employability 
The connection between a liberal arts education and employability is one that has long vexed 
critics and supporters of the tradition alike. When, in 1937, a number of prominent liberal arts 
educators completely overhauled the curriculum at then-struggling St John’s College in 
Maryland, to focus entirely on the so-called Great Books (in the humanities but also the 
sciences), a number of objections were made. Sidney Hook (1946), in fact a defender of the 
liberal arts tradition, criticised the St John’s experiment on a number of grounds, but not least 
that the link between general education and competence in the workplace was assumed rather 
than demonstrated. As Stefan Collini (2012) has much more recently noted, 
Trying to decide what the demand is likely to be for a new widget may have something in 
common with trying to reconstruct a history of farming practices from thirteenth-century 
manorial records, but it does seem an awfully roundabout route. (142; original emphasis) 
 
For those new HEIs promoting liberal arts degrees, what is often stressed is the 
intellectual value of the degree as against, at least initially, the more quotidian concern of 
employment: 
‘We believe that there are students who wish to study for the sake of studying, even in 
these difficult financial times; students who share Tolstoy’s view that “without knowing 
what I am and why I am here, life is impossible.” In offering Liberal Arts again at 
_______, we hope to show that education can be more, much more, than just a training 
and preparation for a job’ (new). 
 
Even here the rhetoric of employability seeps in, but it lacks a good deal of the instrumentalism 
of more elite institutions we will look at below: 
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‘We hope that our graduates will… as Newman said, “be placed in that state or intellect 
in which he [or she] can take up any [job] for which he has a taste or special talent with 
an ease, a grace, a versatility, and success”’ (new). 
 
Again, differences between selecting and recruiting institutions may account for the 
apparent caution with which less prestigious HEIs make claims about the value of their degrees. 
Certainly, the link made rather subtly here between occupation and the ‘ease’ inculcated by a 
liberal education is, in general, made much more confidently by elite HEIs. The soft skills of 
team-working, leadership, communication and critical thinking, along with the general culture 
provided by an adequate versing in the humanities, are often alluded to. The below quotation 
from Apple founder Steve Jobs is not infrequently used in this context:     
‘Technology alone is not enough. It’s technology married with the liberal arts, married 
with the humanities, that yields us the results that make our hearts sing’ (post-war). 
 
Culture and employability are here presented not as antithetical, nor even as merely coincidental 
to one another; rather, it is the very ‘softness’ of the liberal arts training that leads to its value in 
the labour market. Intellectual curiosity, polymathy, the innovative and entrepreneurial spirit and 
a concern for self-knowledge, self-mastery and an ethical existence – in short the intellectual life 
itself – is hereby instrumentalised.  
 Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello (2007 [1999]) have shown how, since the middle of the 
1970s, the innovative spirit of counter-cultural movements has been incorporated into a modern 
form of capitalism which asks not merely that workers be motivated by the Protestant work ethic 
or the Fordist ideology of efficiency, as in previous generations, but that they exhibit a passion 
for their work, understood as an ethical project. The new capitalist worker is thus motivated 
beyond any financial incentive to invest on a personal level in justifications for the work, to be 
creative, and go beyond what is required merely to ‘get the job done’.  Such a ‘spirit’ is, for 
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Boltanski and Chiapello, an ideology both in the sense of a large-scale social structure exerting 
force on individuals, and a sincerely felt subjective drive. Any attempt to parse sincere 
intellectual curiosity, creativity and ethical drive from ‘mere’ instrumentality, efficiency and 
market processes will miss the way in which the new spirit of capitalism binds these apparently 
contradictory forces together. As one frequently asked questions page on the liberal arts 
webpages of an elite HEI puts it: 
‘Q. I’m not clear: is this a course aimed at the future job market or at people who really 
want in-depth study? 
A. We think Arts and Sciences can do both’ (old). 
 
Liberal arts are explicitly presented as a way to align the ‘training’ provided by higher 
education with the needs of employers in the move from an industrial to a knowledge economy 
(Etkowitz, Ranga and Dzisah, 2012). It is the softness and flexibility of the skills associated with 
liberal arts degrees which make them particularly aligned with the new spirit of capitalism. The 
difficulty which promoters of liberal arts face is that such skills, precisely because they suggest 
flexibility, adaptability and intellectual polymathy (or even dilettantism), are notably generic.  
 
Unique individuals with generic skills 
‘You’ll be an excellent communicator who can present and defend your views clearly, 
and you’ll be confident working independently or as a team. You’ll also have strong 
research skills and highly developed skills of analysis and interpretation’ (old). 
 
In the above list of skills that a graduate from a liberal arts degree at an elite university is said to 
have achieved, we see a particularly stark invocation of the highly generic nature of soft skills. 
This might describe many people with any number of different degrees, and indeed a large 
number without. What is alluded to here is what Tholen, Relly, Warhurst and Commander 
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(2016) call ‘graduateness’, ‘a collective reference that includes soft skills and generic skills such 
as time management, commitment, organisation, independence, roundedness and life experience’ 
(Tholen, 2016: 11). In a context where it is such generic skills, rather than specific levels of 
technical competence, which are prized, what marks out the elite graduate is a pre-existing 
tendency toward the desired personal traits of innovation, creativity, curiosity, polymathy and the 
pioneering spirit. For those HEIs which select rather than recruiting students, the generic nature 
of the soft skills engendered by a liberal arts degree does not preclude an appeal to a highly 
individualised, in fact unique, liberal arts student, whose desirable personal qualities largely 
precede acceptance onto the course: 
‘we will be looking for students… with the intellectual curiosity to want to explore new 
subject areas and extra-curricular experiences’ (old). 
‘Liberal arts is for true intellects who want to indulge their curiosity for knowledge’ 
(post-war). 
 
The prospective liberal arts student is asked not merely to exhibit cultural capital (even before 
beginning the degree) here, but to demonstrate that they have, in Philip Brown, Anthony Hesketh 
and Sara Williams’s (2003) words, converted this into personal capital. Here the elite 
universities appear to work in analogous ways to elite employers, who increasingly stress that 
applicants should already exhibit that personal capital required to be fit for more specialist 
training on the job (Brown and Hesketh, 2004). 
The focus on pre-existing qualities amongst selecting institutions also feeds into a 
meritocratic story elite HEIs often tell about the students they select. Such a story tends not to 
reflect on how such qualities are inculcated (or indeed measured), as we will see below. It is also 
in marked contrast to those non-elite institutions that recruit students, and so tend to focus on 
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those skills which will be imparted through the intervention of the degree itself, rather than 
preceding it: 
‘You will learn to view the world from fresh perspectives, becoming more independent, 
mature, versatile and confident in the process’ (new).        
 
 The uniqueness of the elite liberal arts student (the unique way in which they will 
develop the generic skills required by the labour market) is also invoked through reference to the 
unique, ‘bespoke’ nature of the degree itself: 
‘Students create a bespoke programme’ (old). 
‘You will build a bespoke pathway of study’ (post-war). 
‘The wide range of my interests in [sic] reflected in my programme of study, which shows 
everyone else, including employers, what makes me different, and how I stand out from 
the crowd’ (student testimonial, old). 
 
 Finally here, there is a focus on the unusualness of having a liberal arts degree, this 
pioneering course for pioneering students, at all. Crucially, this is what will allow liberal arts 
graduates to stand out on the crowded job market: 
‘you will be challenged to develop a unique set of skills that will make you stand out in 
the increasingly competitive job market (old). 
‘A Liberal Arts and Sciences degree will set you apart in a competitive job market’ (old). 
‘Set yourself apart’ (new). 
‘A successful person must have a spark of creativity which will set them apart, something 
which is imparted by studying Liberal Arts’ (post-war). 
‘your broad knowledge and research expertise will help you stand out from graduates of 
more specialised degrees’ (post-war). 
‘This course is for those who aren’t afraid to set themselves apart from the mainstream 
and to challenge the rules of education itself’ (student testimonial, old). 
‘In addition to your subject disciplines, you will learn… [inter alia] how to present 
yourself as an interesting, well-rounded individual’ (new). 
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(In this last the question of whether one is likely to become an interesting individual in fact is 
rather left hanging.) As in the crowd’s response to Brian’s insistence that they are all individuals 
(en masse, ‘Yes, we are all individuals!’) in Monty Python’s Life of Brian, the purported 
uniqueness of the liberal arts student is at least in tension with their generic ‘graduateness’ and 
the homogenising way in which HEIs present all liberal arts students as the same sort of unique 
individual. Clearly this concern with the unique student feeds into the broader problem of elitism 
associated with the liberal arts: that while such degrees may stress the role of general education 
in civic life, they also tend to appeal to a particular demographic of student. 
 
Democracy and the elite 
Like their US counterparts, English HEIs must manage a particular tension when it comes to the 
function of a liberal education. On the one hand, the concept of acculturating students to the 
higher intellectual pursuits, or of favouring those students already endowed with a particular 
intellectual habitus, might lead us to a reading of the liberal arts which stresses some concept of 
an intellectual elite. In the US this is often framed as ‘preparation for leadership’. On the other 
hand, the idea of the liberal arts is also often justified on the grounds that it will reinvigorate 
democracy by preparing good citizens for civic life. Social justice is at the centre of such claims, 
as in the following extract: 
‘You engage with unusual, controversial, and provocative ideas, so that you can use the 
humanities and social sciences to become critically aware and possess the tools to 
change the world for the better’ (post-war). 
 
As with other tensions which animate English incarnations of the liberal arts, different 
types of HEI present the problem in different ways. New HEIs tend to stress liberal arts as what 
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can invigorate the institution itself, and this reinvigoration as key to a broader contribution to 
democratic processes. Again, because new HEIs are recruiting rather than selecting institutions 
(that is, it is students who choose between recruiting institutions, rather than HEIs choosing 
between students, as at selective HEIs), they stress what is unique and important about the 
institution rather than its prospective students: 
‘The challenge we have responded to is to retrieve the tradition of the study of Liberal 
Arts while at the same time articulating the ways in which it might make a singular 
contribution to modern undergraduate higher education. The term ‘modern’ here is 
essential in making our course distinctive not only against historical manifestations of the 
Liberal Arts, but also to emphasise our renewed vision of higher education for the 
modern world’ (new). 
Here what is alluded to is not merely the role of liberal arts in invigorating higher education, and 
thereby society more broadly; this new HEI also implicitly distances itself from some more 
problematic tendencies associated with the liberal arts historically. Although there is an 
acknowledgement that elitism has been a problem for the tradition, then, there is a concerted 
effort to stress the capacity for liberal arts to contribute to democratic processes.  
 The idea of the unknowable future, discussed above, is a particular feature of the way in 
which post-war institutions link the idea of an elite to the democratic functions of the liberal arts. 
Although the concept of reinvigorating civil society or of ‘giving something back’ is central 
here, as for the new HEIs, this is tied to an individualised conception of how particular people 
with particular skills will flourish in an unknowable future: 
‘To be able to think as broadly and as deeply as you can is the key to success in this 
world, the world that’s coming into being’ (post-war).  
 
The old universities, by contrast, most explicitly and unashamedly invoke an elite, in 
conjunction with the concept of citizenship. Here society will be reinvigorated precisely by an 
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elite (a new ‘generation of leaders’) taking a specific role in society (as well as enhancing their 
own prospects): 
 ‘You must be of the highest intellectual calibre, and we are looking for a commitment to 
embrace the challenge of a truly cosmopolitan education’ (old). 
‘for a new breed of dynamic business, public service, and political leaders’ (old). 
 
Despite an insistence on the importance of general education and critical thinking, at least 
six old and two post-war HEIs do not accept the soon-to-be-defunct general studies and critical 
thinking A level. This qualification is routinely discounted amongst prestigious HEIs and 
especially amongst the most prestigious degrees, such as medicine, when offers of places are 
made to students, because it is considered academically unrigorous as well as generic. There is a 
clear class dynamic to the uptake of general studies at A level: in 2004 only 35.7% of 
independent schools offered the qualification, as opposed to 63.8% of comprehensive schools 
(Rodeiro 2005). It is difficult to see the exclusion of the A level most clearly resembling the 
liberal arts degree as much more than the policing of ‘serious study’ and the exercising of a right 
to determine the social meaning of credentials. As Tholen (2016) has argued, as the link between 
credentials, skills and income is loosened, the symbolic function of higher education becomes 
increasingly important. Irrespective, then, of an insistence on disciplinary breadth and flexibility, 
soft skills training and critical thought as what will help the successful graduate of tomorrow 
‘stand out from the crowd’, prestige remains central to beliefs about credentials. 
Although the old universities are the most explicit in their appeal to an idea of an 
intellectual elite, they nonetheless must simultaneously try to take the problematic edge of elitism 
out of their claims. Feeding into a much broader justification of an intellectual elite on 
meritocratic grounds, old HEIs tend to stress the natural capabilities of their desired students: 
22 
 
‘Academically able and naturally inquisitive, our Liberal Arts and Sciences programme 
is designed to create the next generation of leaders’ (old). 
‘_______ students are, by nature, dynamic, busy people with lots of interests both within 
and outside the classroom’ (old). 
 
Such an appeal to natural ability takes its terms from the assumptions both that prospective 
students can be unproblematically sifted into those with ‘ability’ and ‘inquisitiveness’ and those 
without (the uninquisitive student?), and that such perceived differences can be 
unproblematically attributed to nature. It is also part of an increasing focus on personal qualities, 
often coded as talent, as central to what will allow elite students to stand out in the context of 
contemporary credential inflation (Brown, Power, Tholen and Allouch, 2016). Irrespective of the 
widening participation and other initiatives elite HEIs engage in, often with an explicit 
recognition of the role of family circumstance and educational experience in the eventual 
presentation of ‘ability’ amongst prospective students, they simultaneously and unreflexively 
draw upon and feed into broader discourses of nature, merit and an intellectual elite. 
 
Conclusion 
The movement from an elite to a mass higher education system, from a social-mobility to a 
marketised conception of meritocracy, and toward an increasingly generic conception of 
employability, has created significant shifts in the way in which the humanities must present 
themselves. The emergence of the liberal arts degree in England in the last fifteen years is quite 
intelligible if we consider the various ways in which English, and indeed European, higher 
education has steadily been getting closer to its American counterpart (Van der Wende, 2011). In 
a massified system, and irrespective of the attempts of previous governments to homogenise and 
democratise the system, an elite differentiates itself. This is all the more true when the notion of 
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the free market and students as consumers increasingly exists alongside the older ideology of 
meritocracy. In such a context, a turn to US models is quite understandable. The way that 
American models are translated into the English context is different, however, for different sorts 
of HEI. 
 For those institutions which must recruit students (that is, those which actively compete 
with one another for students and make significantly more offers to students than will be taken 
up), the liberal arts are a way of presenting the institution itself as innovative, simultaneously 
forward-looking and ‘traditional’ and, crucially, as contributing more broadly to something like 
civil society. For selective institutions, however, it is the prospective liberal arts student who is 
presented as innovative and ‘unique’. Such institutions simultaneously flatter and sift prospective 
students and, whilst making appeals to a conception of liberal arts as suited to an elite, do not for 
all that forego the idea of the reinvigoration of democracy to be found more broadly amongst 
appeals to the liberal arts. 
 Throughout all of these promotional attempts, a series of tensions must be managed. The 
idea of the liberal arts as invoking tradition (one of the ways in which HEIs can attribute the 
degrees with prestige) must be balanced with a concern to present (its current, English) 
manifestation as new, innovative and pioneering. The idea of the unknowable future is crucial 
here in positing a need for new, flexible and interdisciplinary degrees. Such flexibility will, it is 
claimed, be invaluable in our ‘rapidly changing world’. Notably, then, the innovation of the 
degrees is tied into employability: it is the very non-vocational nature of the courses which 
makes them, paradoxically, of most use on the labour market. If the skills provided by liberal arts 
degrees are thereby both ‘soft’ and generic, the liberal arts student is presented, particularly at 
prestigious institutions, as unique. 
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 Not least, and running throughout these other tensions, the promotion of the liberal arts in 
England must negotiate the tension between an elite and a mass conception of higher education 
itself. On the one hand, with its concentration on citizenship and the reinvigoration of 
democracy, the liberal arts degree seems well matched to a mass higher education system. This is 
certainly what new universities suggest, but all types of HEI make an appeal to this conception 
of liberal arts as civic engagement. Despite this, the idea of the liberal arts remains tied to the 
concept of a small group being prepared for leadership and, as Colm Kelly (2012) has argued, ‘it 
is tempting to move from saying that liberal education is education for freedom, to saying that 
the majority of people have little taste for such freedom and such education’ (58). This tension 
between democracy and elitism is not merely a problem for the liberal arts, however. As this 
article has tried to show, it is a much broader problem for mass systems emerging from elite 
ones. 
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1 Because education is a devolved matter for the four constituent nations of the United Kingdom, I focus here on the 
English context. 
2 Indeed the very concept of post-war social mobility can be construed as a myth: whilst the growth of white-collar 
jobs presented opportunities for the upper-working class to rise, there was no concomitant downward social mobility 
amongst the middle class, and the shift in relative position between members of different classes was slight 
(Roberts, 2014). This is what Bourdieu means in his central claim that ‘what the competitive struggle makes 
everlasting is not different positions, but the difference between positions’ (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1979 [1964]: 
96).  
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